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Abstract—In this paper, an incentive proactive cache mecha-
nism in cache-enabled small cell networks (SCNs) is proposed, in
order to motivate the content providers (CPs) to participate in
the caching procedure. A network composed of a single mobile
network operator (MNO) and multiple CPs is considered. The
MNO aims to define the price it charges the CPs to maximize
its revenue while the CPs compete to determine the number
of files they cache at the MNO’s small base stations (SBSs) to
improve the quality of service (QoS) of their users. This problem
is formulated as a Stackelberg game where a single MNO is
considered as the leader and the multiple CPs willing to cache
files are the followers. The followers game is modeled as a non-
cooperative game and both the existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium (NE) are proved. The closed-form expression
of the NE which corresponds to the amount of storage each CP
requests from the MNO is derived. An optimization problem is
formulated at the MNO side to determine the optimal price that
the MNO should charge the CPs. Simulation results show that
at the equilibrium, the MNO and CPs can all achieve a utility
that is up to 50% higher than the cases in which the prices and
storage quantities are requested arbitrarily.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever increasing number of mobile phones and connected
devices is expected to contribute to an 800% increase in mobile
data traffic in the five upcoming years [1]. Bandwidth intensive
applications such as video-on-demand traffic will represent
more than 70% of the global generated data requests [1]. To
support this growing traffic and offload macro base stations,
short range small base stations (SBSs) are deployed closer to
the end-users. However, these SBSs are connected to a core
network via capacity-limited backhaul links which makes it
difficult to meet users’ requirements in terms of quality-of-
service (QoS), especially during peak hours. To deal with this
problem, distributed caching at the network edge has recently
been proposed as a promising solution [2].
The idea of distributed caching consists in equipping the
SBSs with storage units in which files are cached according
to a placement policy. Thus, the SBSs can serve most of the
requests locally without using the backhaul. However, for a
successful deployment of proactive edge caching, the mobile
network operators (MNOs) require cooperation of the content
providers (CPs) to be able to cache their content at the SBSs
[3]. To this end, incentive mechanisms must be developed by
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the operators to incite CPs to share and cache their content.
The MNO offers to the CPs the caching service that allows
the CPs’ users to improve their QoS and in return the CPs
pay a price defined by the MNO depending on the amount of
storage space requested by each CP.
Recently, several caching works have appeared from dif-
ferent aspects, such as optimal caching policies in layered
video delivery [4], device-to-device (D2D) networks [5],
hieararchical caching [6], multi-cell scenario with limited-
backhaul [7] and so on (see [3] for detailed discussions).
More relevantly, there exist some works focusing on economic
aspect of caching in wireless D2D networks. In such networks,
the operators define pricing scheme to motivate users to
proactively download the most popular files and cache them in
their devices to serve other users’ requests. In [8], the authors
proposed a smart pricing scheme to maximize the benefit of
the operator and minimize the charged price to the users. Via
D2D communications, users can trade their cached files to
minimize their expected payments. On the other hand, the
operator defines a dynamic pricing model that differentiates
off-peak and peak time periods to maximize its own benefit.
The authors in [9] formulated the cache incentive problem as
a Stackelberg game in which the SBSs are the leaders and
the users are the followers. In this model, the SBSs start by
anticipating users’ reactions and determine the optimal price
that maximizes their offloaded traffic from to the users devices.
Given a defined reward by the SBSs, users can then decide
whether to help the SBSs by caching the files and serving
other users or not.
Despite being interesting, all these works focused on cache
incentive mechanisms in D2D wireless networks and ignored
the role of CPs in the caching process. The main contribution
of this work is to propose a new cache incentive mechanism
between an MNO and multiple CPs. We formulate the cache
incentive problem as a Stackleberg game in which the MNO is
a leader and the CPs are the followers. The MNO predicts the
requests profile of the CPs and define the price that maximizes
its revenue. On the other hand, due to limited storage capacity
of the SBSs, CPs cannot cache all their files, thus, the CPs
compete to maximize the amount of storage space they request
given the fixed price by the MNO. The competition between
the CPs is formulated as a non-cooperative sub-game in which
each CP aims to maximize the satisfaction of its users in terms
of transmission rate. Both the existence and uniqueness of the
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Figure 1: An illustration of the system model.
Nash equilibrium (NE) are proved. The NE represents a state
in which none of the CPs can improve its benefit by requesting
a different amount of storage space given the requested amount
by the other CPs fixed. We provide closed-form expressions
of the storage amount the CPs must request at the NE. Then,
given the request profiles of the CPs, an optimization problem
is formulated at the MNO to determine the optimal price that
should be charged to the CPs to maximize the MNO’s revenue.
Simulation results show that the MNO can get a revenue that
is up to 50% higher compared to the case in which the prices
are selected arbitrarily. Moreover, at the equilibrium, we show
that the CPs can achieve a utility that is 20% to 50% higher
compared to the two cases in which half and the double of the
storage space at the NE are requested by the CPs, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we define the system and the caching models. The Stack-
elberg game is formulated in Section III, and the analysis is
conducted in Section IV. The numerical results are presented
in Section V. We finally draw conclusions in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
We consider an heterogeneous network (HetNet) which
consists of N cache-enabled SBSs and is controlled by one
MNO. There are M CPs that are willing to cache their
files in the HetNet in order to enhance the QoS of their
users. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} denote the set of cache-
enabled SBSs, each of which has a limited capacity sn,
and M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} denote the set of CPs. Each CP
requests from the MNO to cache its qm most popular files.
The N SBSs are connected to the MNO with a backhaul
such as DSL, optical fibers or wireless backhaul. All the user
equipments (UEs) communicate with the corresponding SBSs.
If the desired files from the UEs are not cached in the SBSs,
they are served by the MNO via the capacity-limited backhaul
links. The system model is depicted in Fig. 1.
Each CP m has a local content catalog Fm with Fm files.
The global files catalog is denoted F = ⋃Fm, and all the
files are assumed to have the same unit size. We assume that
each file fi is cached by the MNO pfi times at the SBSs based
on the popularity of the file. The goal of each CP is to cache
its most popular files locally at the SBSs so that the users
experience an improved data transmission rate. However, the
Table I: List of Notations.
N = {1, 2, . . . , N} set of SBSs
M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} set of CPs
qm The number of files that CP m wants to cache
pfi The number of cached copies of file fi
sn The cache size of each SBS n
pi The charged price for caching a given file
uo The utility of MNO
um The utility of CPs
Qm The set of files requested by each CP m
pm The mean access probability of CP m’s files
d(Qm) The total caching copies of requested files of all CPs
storage capacity of the SBSs is limited and not all the files
can be cached with sufficient copies. The notations used in the
rest of this paper is summarized in Table I.
B. Cache Incentive Model
We formulate the cache incentive problem as a Stackelberg
game in which a non-cooperative game is involved as a sub-
game. As shown in Fig. 1, the Stackelberg game is played
between the MNO and the M CPs. On the one hand, all the
CPs wish to cache as many as possible files at the MNO’s
HetNet such that the QoS of their users (for example the
delay) is improved. On the other hand, there exists a cost for
caching. Therefore, the incentive proactive caching mechanism
is controlled by a charge price determined by the MNO to
optimize its revenue in the proposed Stackelberg game. The
sequential game (Stackelberg) leads to a more competitive
equilibrium than the simultaneous move game: The MNO
plays as the leader providing the caching price pi to all the
CPs, while the CPs play as the followers reacting with their
optimal number of files they want to cache based on the given
price. Both the MNO and the CPs are rational and optimize
their own utilities denoted as uo and um, respectively. The
strategy of the leader MNO is the caching price pi and the
strategies of the followers CPs are their the number of files
they want to cache qm(pi). It should be noted that the price
defined by the MNO depends on the used caching policy and
the storage capacity of all the SBSs.
Due to the limited caching capacity, the M CPs compete for
the possible caching quantities. Therefore, a non-cooperative
game is played as a sub-game among the M CPs. We assume
that the file access probability of each file is perfectly known at
all the entities (i.e., CPs and MNO). The strategies of the CPs
are the quantity of their caching requests. Under the perfect
knowledge of the access probability of each caching file, the
CPs will choose to cache the first q∗m files ordered with the
highest access probability, i.e., popularity.
III. STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we provide the utilities of the MNO and the
CPs, respectively. The proposed Stackelberg game is played
as follows. The leader plays first by providing its optimal
strategy to all the followers after predicting the strategies of the
followers. Then, the followers reply with their best strategies
given the strategy of the leader. The result of the Stackelberg
game is that both the leader and the followers optimize their
utilities. The Stackelberg equilibrium is exactly the point that
the leader wishes. The basic idea of the utilities for both the
MNO and the CP can be formulated as a general function,
such as Utility = Revenue−Cost. In the following, we will
analyse the utilities of the MNO and the CPs, respectively.
A. Utility of the MNO
For the MNO, the main cost is the caching storage cost
denoted as Co. This caching storage cost is a function of the
caching capacity of all the SBSs and the number of times each
file is cached. Therefore, the cost of caching all CPs files Co
for the MNO can be defined as the following barrier function:
Co =
{
1
S−d(QM) if 0 < d(QM) ≤ S∞ otherwise, (1)
where d(QM) is the amount of all the cached files by the
MNO and is given by:
d(QM) =
M∑
m=1
∑
fi∈Qm
pfi , (2)
where pfi is the number of copies of file fi that are cached at
the SBSs and defined by the MNO depending on the popularity
of file fi. The caching capacity of the MNO is given by:
S =
N∑
n=1
sn. (3)
The revenue of the MNO in the caching problem is the total
charge from all the CPs for caching their files. The price of
caching one file is denoted by pi and the number of files that
is requested by a CP m to be cached is qm. Thus, the total
revenue of the MNO can be given by
Ro = pi
M∑
m=1
qm(pi). (4)
Now we obtain the utility function of the MNO in our
proposed Stackelberg game as a function of the quantity of
caching request from all the CPs, q = [q1, . . . , qM ].
uo(q(pi)) = Ro(q(pi))− Co(q(pi)), (5)
where Ro and Co are defined in (1) and (4), respectively.
B. Utility of the CPs
Given that the MNO fixes a price pi for a storage unit, all the
CPs reply with their quantity of caching request by optimizing
their own utilities. We assume that each CP is independent of
the others and makes its best strategy only based on its local
information.
The cost of CPs for the caching requests are the charge
paid to the MNO for their desired quantity of caching files.
For each CP m, the cost Cm is defined as
Cm = piqm(pi), (6)
where qm(pi) is a function of the provided charge price pi. Cm
is an increasing function of the caching quantity qm(pi).
In fact, the CPs such as Facebook and Youtube are con-
cerned about the satisfaction of their users. This user sat-
isfaction, which can be the delay of downloading a file or
the data throughput, is an increasing function of the caching
request quantity qm of CP m and a decreasing function of
the caching request quantities q−m of others because of the
limited caching capacity. q−m is defined as the caching request
quantities of all the other CPs except CP m, i.e.,
q−m = [q1, . . . , qm−1, qm+1, . . . , qM ]. (7)
The revenue of CPs can be easily defined as the satisfaction
function of each CP. We assume that the qm files with the
highest access probabilities in each CP m are requested. Then
the satisfaction function of CP m is as follows, which is an
increasing function of the caching request quantity.
Rm = log
(
1 +
qm
1 + 1αm Jm
)
, (8)
where Jm =
∑
l 6=m ql is the quantity of caching files requested
by all the other CPs except CP m and αm is the amount of
generated requests by the users of CP m. The satisfaction Rm
of a CP m was chosen as it is an increasing function of the
number of files that are cached by a CP m as well as its traffic
load αm. Indeed, the more files are cached at the SBSs and
the higher the popularity of the files, the higher is the number
of requests that can be served locally from the SBSs. Thus,
more users of CP m can experience a higher transmission rate.
On the other hand, the satisfaction of a CP m decreases as the
number of files cached by the other CPs increases. In this case,
less storage is available for CP m and a higher number of its
requests need to be served through the backhaul. It should be
noted that any other function that has the same properties as
Rm can be chosen as a satisfaction function.
Given the constraints on the caching capacity of the mobile
network, now we obtain the utility function of each CP m as
um = Rm − Cm, (9)
where the cost Cm and the revenue Rm are defined in (6) and
(8), respectively. It is obvious that um is a concave function
of the quantity of the caching requests.
Given the charge price from the MNO, all the CPs respond
with their quantities of caching requests simultaneously by
maximizing their own utilities. Due to the limited caching
capacity S, all the CPs can be considered as competitive
players competing for the caching quantities. Therefore, we
can formulate the quantity optimization problem of CPs as
a non-cooperative game G = G(M,Q,U) consisting of the
following components:
• The set of players in G is the set M of CPs.
• Given the quantity profile q−m ∈ Qm =
∏
l 6=mQl of
the opponents of player m, the feasible action set of CP
in the presence of the caching capacity d(QM ) ≤ S is
QM (q−m) = {qm ∈ Qm : qm ≥ 0}. (10)
• The utility um of player m is given by (9).
In this context, the most adopted solution concept is the NE.
Definition 1. A quantity profile q∗ is a NE of the caching
request quantity game G if
q∗m ∈ Qm(q∗−m), ∀m ∈M, (11)
um(q
∗) ≥ um(qm,q∗−m), ∀qm ∈ Qm(q∗−m). (12)
Provided the utility functions for the MNO and CPs, the
optimal strategies of the leader and the followers are derived
in the next section. In the Stackelberg game, the followers’
strategies are predicted before the leader makes its own
strategy. Therefore, the optimal quantity of caching requests
of the CPs is analyzed first.
IV. STACKELBERG GAME SOLUTION
In this section, we derive the solution of the proposed
Stackelberg game. In the sequential (Stackelberg) game, the
leader moves first by predicting the strategies of the followers.
The followers reply by optimizing their own utilities given
the strategy of the leader. The result of the game is that the
followers play exactly what the leader wishes. Therefore, the
optimal strategy of the followers should be predicted first.
In the following, we obtain the optimal quantities of caching
requests of the CPs in the closed form.
A. Optimal Quantity of Caching Request
The CPs optimize their strategies of the quantity of the
caching requests and provide them to the MNO given the
charge price pi announced by the MNO. The optimal qm is
obtained by solving the following problem.
qm = arg max
q
um subject to q ≥ 0. (13)
Given the charge price for the caching files, the CPs compete
for the quantity of caching requests, which formulates a non-
cooperative game. In the following, we find the solution for
this non-cooperative game.
Proposition 1 (Best Response). Given the charge price pi
announced by the MNO, the best response (BR) of each CP
is the quantity of caching files it requests, which is
qBRm =
(
1
pi
− 1− Jm
αm
)+
, (14)
with αm ≥M .
Proof: The BR of the caching request quantity qBRm is
obtained by checking the first derivative of um with respect
to qm,
∂um
∂qm
=
αm
αm + αmqm + Jm
− pi = 0. (15)
The second derivative of um with respect to qm is
∂2um
∂q2m
=
−α2m
(αm + αmqm + Jm)2
< 0, (16)
which guarantees a global optimal of um. Since the utility of
each CP um is a convex function of qm, (14) is proved. The
function ()+ is to ensure the requested caching quantity to be
a non-negative value.
Remark 1. The total quantity of the caching requests of all
the other CPs can be learnt or fed back at each CP. The qBRm
is based on the local information αm, qm and the feedback
Jm as a single value of the summation.
Now we prove that the proposed non-cooperative game
admits a unique NE.
Theorem 1 (Nash Equilibrium). Given the charge price pi
announced by the MNO, the NE of each CP is the quantity of
caching files it requests, which is
qNEm =
Dm
D
=
( 1pi − 1)ambm
D
, (17)
where am is
am =
{
1− 1
αm
− 1−α1
α1
∑M
l=2,l 6=m
αm−αl
(αl−1)αm if m 6= 1
1− 1
α1
− 1−αM
αM
∑M−1
l=2
α1−αl
(αl−1)α1 if m = 1
(18)
and bm is
bm =
{ ∏M
l=2,l 6=m(1− 1αl ) if m 6= 1∏M−1
l=2 (1− 1αl ) if m = 1
(19)
and
D =
(
1− 1− α1
α1
M∑
l=2
1
αl − 1
)
M∏
l=2
(
1− 1
αl
)
. (20)
If M = 2, then
∑M−1
l=2
α1−αl
(αl−1)α1 = 0 and
∏M−1
l=0 1− 1αl = 1.
Proof: We give only the sketch of the proof due to the
space limitations. The trick for finding the NE of the proposed
non-cooperative game is to jointly solve the M functions of
the BR for all the CPs. The M functions of the BR can be
formulated as a matrix function denoted as Dq = C where
the matrix D and vectors q and C are as follows, respectively.
1 1α1 . . .
1
α1
1
α2
1 . . . 1α2
...
...
. . .
...
1
αM
1
αM
. . . 1


q1
q2
...
qM
 =

1
pi − 1
1
pi − 1
...
1
pi − 1
 . (21)
The NE quantity of each CP is solved by applying the
Cramer’s rule qm =
det(Dm)
det(D) , where det(D) is the determinant
of matrix D and det(Dm) is the determinant of matrix Dm
which is formed by replacing the m-th column of D by the
column vector C.
Remark 2. In caching, there are two basic modes. One is
coded caching in which the SBSs cache any number of bits
from the files. In this case, the NE quantity derived in (17)
is the actual quantity of files requested by CP m. The other
one is uncoded caching, in which a given file can only be
cached as a whole or equally divided chunks. In this case, the
round function be is applied to qNEm before CP m replies to the
MNO in order to obtain the integer optimal quantity of caching
request. In our model, we assume the uncoded caching case so
that only integer quantity of caching requests are considered.
B. Optimal Charge Price
After predicting the strategy policies of the CPs, the MNO
optimizes the charge price pi by solving the following problem.
pi∗ = arg max
pi
uo(q(pi)) subject to pi ≥ 0. (22)
We observe from (1) and (2) that the quantity of caching
request from each CP m exists in the size of the set Qm.
Therefore, we assume that the number of copies of each file
fi ∈ Qm that are cached are defined as the quantized vector
given by:
pfi = [. . . , pm −∆pm, pm, pm + ∆pm, . . . ] (23)
with size of qm for each CP m. pm is the mean access
probability of files requested by CP m and ∆pm is the step
size.
Given the number of times pfi each file fi is cached as
defined in (23), we obtain∑
fi∈Qm
pfi = q
NE
m f(pm), (24)
where f(pm) is a function of the mean access probability pm
with the following form
f(pm) =
{
pm when qm is odd,
pm +
∆pm
2
when qm is even.
(25)
Since the MNO can predict the NE quantities of all the CPs,
which are functions of the charge price pi, the utility function
of the MNO is then
uo = pi
M∑
m=1
qm(pi)− 1
S −∑Mm=1 qm(pi)f(pm) . (26)
By predicting the requesting qm(pi) from each CP m, the MNO
can make its own optimal strategy, which is the charge price
pi∗. Here we analyse the case where the total caching requests
do not exceed the caching capacity of the HetNet.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Price). The optimal charge price pi∗
provided by the MNO to maximize its own utility uo is as
follows.
pi∗ =
√
r
t + r
S + r
, (27)
where r is a function of α and t is a function of both α and
p defined as
t =
M∑
m=1
ambm
D
, (28)
and
r =
M∑
m=1
ambmf(pm)
D
. (29)
Proof: Since r and t are independent of the optimization
objective pi, we rewrite the utility function of MNO uo as
uo = (1− pi)t− 1
S − ( 1pi − 1)r
. (30)
Then the first derivative with respect to pi is
∂uo
∂pi
=
r
(Spi − (1− pi)r)2 − t. (31)
The second derivative with respect to pi is
∂2uo
∂pi2
=
−2r(Spi − (1− pi)r)(S + r)
(Spi − (1− pi)r)4 . (32)
By observing that the MNO will definitely provide a price in
order to ensure d(Qm) ≤ S, Spi − (1 − pi)r > 0 and then
∂2uo
∂pi2 < 0, which guarantees a global maximum pi
∗.
By solving ∂uo∂pi = 0 in (31), we get the value of pi
∗ in (27),
which completes the proof.
Notice that the charge price should be a positive value pi∗ >
0, therefore the result
−
√
r
t+r
S+r is dropped.
To ensure a positive total charge and also that the total
caching requests do not exceed the caching capacity S, i.e.,
the cost Co is a positive limited value, the charge price given
by the MNO should be restricted in the following range.
Corollary 1. The caching capacity S of the HetNet can be
fully exploited if the charge price given by the MNO follows
the range
r
S + r
< pi < 1. (33)
Proof: pi < 1 is proved by ensuring 1pi − 1 > 0 in (30).
r
S+r < pi is proved by ensuring
1
S−( 1pi−1)r
> 0 in (30).
Remark 3. The optimal price pi∗ provided in (27) always
satisfies the feasible price range in (33).
C. Example
In this part, we show the 2-CP case as an example to
illustrate the incentive Stackelberg game on caching. The
protocol of the proposed Stackelberg game played between the
MNO and CPs and the non-cooperative game played among
the CPs are described as follows.
• The MNO predicts the NE quantities of the caching
requests from all the CPs before making its own strategy.
qNE1 =
( 1pi )(α1 − 1)α2
α1α2 − 1 , (34)
qNE2 =
( 1pi )(α2 − 1)α1
α1α2 − 1 . (35)
• The optimal charge price pi∗ is the strategy of the MNO
by maximizing its utility uo.
pi∗ =
r +
√
r
t
r + S
, (36)
where r =
∑2
m=1
(αm−1)αl 6=m
α1α2−1 , t =∑2
m=1
(αm−1)αl6=m
α1α2−1 f(pm) and f(pm) = pm +
∆pm
2 .
• Given the charge price for each file of the caching request,
each CP chooses a quantity of caching files as its best
response.
qBR1 = (
1
pi
− 1)− q2
α1
qBR2 = (
1
pi
− 1)− q1
α2
.
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Figure 2: Numerical results for a) convergence of the best response for 2-CP case, b) utility function of the MNO with respect to charge
price pi for 2-CP case, and c) utility of CP with respect to the total number of CPs M .
• The BR quantities of both CPs converge to the NE
quantities in (34) and (35), respectively. The resulting
qNEm maximizes both the utilities of the MNO and CPs.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to illustrate the outcome of the proposed game-
theoretical cache problem, without loss of generality, we
simulate the scenario of one MNO and 2 CPs with different
parameters. We assume identical file size as 10GB for high
quality videos.
Fig. 2a shows the BR dynamic of the non-cooperative game
for the 2-CP case. The parameters of the simulations are as
follows: α1 = 5, α2 = 7. The charge price provided by
the MNO is set as pi = 0.3. The initial value of CP 2 is
set to be qint2 = 0. We can observe that the proposed non-
cooperative game converges very rapidly. The convergence is
irrespective of the initial points. The convergence values result
in the same quantities as the theoretical NE solutions given in
(17) in Thereom 1.
Fig. 2b shows the utility function of the MNO with respect
to the charge price. We can see that the proposed utility of
the MNO always admits a global optimum for different sets
of parameters. The utilities of the MNO with higher caching
capacity are higher. This is because more caching requests can
be served and less caching cost is spent for the same amount
of caching files. The difference of the starting points of the
curves are due to the feasible price region in Corollary 1. The
global optimum in Fig. 2b result in the same price derived in
(27). With the optimum price, the utility of the MNO improves
even up to 50% than arbitrary chosen prices.
Fig. 2c shows the utility of a single CP with respect
to the total number of CPs M while the quantity of the
caching request qm changes. The charge price is provided as
the optimal price pi∗ for different total number of CPs. The
optimal quantity q∗m is derived accordingly. The utilities with
double quantity 2q∗m and half quantity
q∗m
2 are provided for
comparison, respectively. From Fig. 2c, we observe that the
more CPs, the lower the utility um of each CP. This is due to
the increasing number of CPs which results in the increase of
the amount of storage space that is requested by the CPs and
thus, a higher price is charged by the MNO. Moreover, the
utility of each CP decreases according to (8) when the total
storage capacity allocated for the other CPs increases. We can
also see that by requesting the optimal caching quantity q∗m,
each CP achieves 20% higher utility than requesting q
∗
m
2 and
up to 50% than requesting 2q∗m.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied a Stackelberg game of proactive edge
caching between the leader MNO and the followers CPs. The
best response, the resulting NE caching quantities, and the
optimum charge price have been derived in closed forms; and
the convergence of our proposed incentive mechanism has
been validated via numerical studies. These numerical results
also showed that both the MNO and CPs can achieve up to
50% higher utilities in the proposed Stackelberg game. This
clearly points out the need of incentive caching mechanisms
in 5G wireless networks.
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